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Abstract 
According to various economists, a main reason for a so-called demonstrative (conspicuous, ostentatious) consumption is a 
signaling of economic wealth, i.e. the aim to demonstrate a social status of the individual, or the aim to pretend so. The latter 
mentioned behavior generates a base for counterfeit (fake) goods consumption that imitates consumption of well-known brands 
and trademarks. We build a discrete choice model with binary dependent variables, which employs the data from the omnibus 
research in the Czech Republic and determines a probability of a certain action by certain individuals with common characteristics. 
Our results indicate that measures age, household income, size of community people live in and opinion about noxiousness of the 
market with counterfeits influence the probability of counterfeit goods purchase. 
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1. Introduction 
A market with luxury goods is booming. Bain & Company (2014) reports that the market with luxury goods 
continued in a double-digit growth in 2013 and is about to reach 223 billion EUR in 2014.* Annual reports of subjects 
dealing with this business show that impulses for buying luxury goods increase; there is no correlation with global 
crises or economic cycles, as we can find while analyzing most of other industries – performance of many of them 
sensitively react on the development of GDP, but the luxury market just grows. For example, LVHM† had increased 
 
 
* Source: Bain & Company, 2014. Link: http://www.bain.com/about/press/press-releases/worldwide-luxury-goods-continues-
double-digit-annual-growth.aspx.  
† Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy is one of the most distinguished groups dealing with producing and selling of luxury goods 
(various brands). Data source: LVHM financial reports. http://www.lvmh.com/investor-
relations/documentation/reports?date=2013    
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences.
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annual total revenues from 17.193 billion EUR in 2008 to 29.149 billion EUR in 2013 (net profit 2008: 2.318 billion 
EUR, and 2013: 3.947 billion EUR).‡  
However, the demonstrative consumption and demand for luxury goods forms also another market – a market with 
counterfeit (fake) goods. This market is a very sophisticated and rapidly growing part of the underworld (shadow) 
economy. In 2008, the OECD put the global value of counterfeit goods that crossed international borders at over 250 
billion USD, far larger than other parts of the underworld economy, such as smuggling and human trafficking, and 
similar to the trade in illegal drugs. The international Chamber of Commerce estimated the market to be even larger, 
650 billion USD in 2008 (pirated digital materials included). In 2015, the counterfeit market is expected to exceed 1.7 
trillion USD.§ According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, there are 10 main groups of counterfeit goods: 
electronics, shoes, drugs (pills), CDs & DVDs, clothing, perfumes, watches, cigarettes, computer hardware and toys 
& games.  
With respect to all problems linked to “invisibility” of actions at the market with counterfeit goods, so typical for 
the illegal markets, even so we can say the market with fakes is a relatively unexplored area in comparison with other 
sin markets like narcotics, prostitution, human trafficking or illegally traded weapons. We decided to focus on a 
demand side of the market with counterfeit goods and analyze factors that matter in decision making of counterfeit 
goods’ buyers, more specifically to estimate probabilities of buying luxury goods for various groups with certain 
characteristics. 
The paper is composed as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of literature dealing with the topic of 
counterfeiting and also provides some microeconomic foundations of buying counterfeits. The next part of the text 
presents the data; the fourth chapter explains the model. The following chapter interprets the results and, moreover, 
the probability of buying counterfeits is calculated for several model individuals. The conclusion part and the list of 
references close the paper.  
 
2. Counterfeits in economic research 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of literature that deals with the relationship of consumption of luxury and 
counterfeit goods and individuals’ social status. For more than 300 years we have lived in the society in which the 
social status is not strictly given just by a birth of individual – this has changed in the Age of Enlightenment, i.e. at the 
beginning of the 18th century. As de Botton (2004) writes a man’s worth has began to be judged according to his 
achievements, which frequently brought great wealth. 
When analyzing luxury, a definition of luxury goods should be provided. Since a plenty of them exist and they are 
very similar, we decided to create our own: A luxury good is a good that satisfies not just the core of individual’s 
preference, but also demonstrates a certain high-end level of wealth, social status, stylishness or membership in some 
distinguished group**. The theory based on the work of Engel (1857) says that a luxury good is a sort of normal good 
with a convex-shaped Engel curve, which shows non-linear (exponential) relationship between an income (horizontal 
axis) and a quantity of luxury goods bought (vertical axis). 
A majority of research analyzing consumers of luxury goods is focused on incentives for buying luxury and on 
utility comparisons with purchases of ordinary goods (esp. necessities). So is the research about counterfeits. Wilcox, 
Kim and Sen (2008) conclude that consumers’ desire for fake goods hinges on social motivations underlying their 
luxury brand preferences – people tend to consume luxury brands and counterfeits when they believe it adjusts their 
social position. On the other hand, people seem to reprobate consumption of counterfeits only if luxury brand 
 
 
‡ Other factors can also play a role in the consumption spending increase, for example innovations in payment methods – the 
positive effect of contactless payments is estimated about 8-10 %. For more information, see Trütsch (2014).  
§ Source: CNN, 2012. http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/news/economy/counterfeit-goods/  
** E.g. if you need to know the time, you can easily buy ordinary watch for less than $100, you can also buy your Rolex watch 
or Omega Watch for a price starting at $4,000, or you can buy Patek Phillipe Sky Moon Tourbillon for $1.3 million, Franck Muller 
Aeternitas MEGA 4 for $2.7 million, or even 201-CARAT CHOPARD watch for $25 million. 
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consumption is a part of their value-expressive function. Bearden and Etzel (1982) look into the influence of reference 
groups on publicly and privately purchased luxuries and necessities and find strong brand-oriented decision-making, 
especially when the product is consumed publicly.  
Bloch, Bush and Cambell (1993) provide a remarkable analysis of the demand side of the counterfeit goods’ market 
and they conclude that a major part of consumers prefers a counterfeit good when a significant price advantage is 
related to its purchase. Eisend and Schuchert-Güler (2006) provide overview of existing research and come to several 
interesting conclusions. They find that the scarcity of original product not only influences the value perception of the 
original brand but also of its counterfeit. The willingness to buy counterfeits is related to the personal experience with 
the original product – people, who had a chance to “touch” (rate) a quality of the original good before purchase, tend 
to buy its counterfeit with a higher probability than the others. Authors also suggest that purchase intentions are 
particularly influenced by the situational mood: “In the case of counterfeits, mood processes can explain why people 
are more prone to buy counterfeits even if they know about the illegality of their behavior or the lack of post-purchase 
satisfaction with a product of low quality.” Moreover, Eisend and Schuchert-Güler (2006) explain an effort of 
consumers of counterfeit goods to legitimate these purchases and justify the reasons for that – the mental process of a 
decision-making consumer is especially explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance. It also explains intentions 
for copying processes (imitating) and determinants related to a specific person (social and cultural context…) and 
conflict between attitudes and decisions, when consumers develop copying strategies in order to reduce their 
dissonance. Hoe, Hogg and Hart (2003) label a market with counterfeit goods as a victimless market, where an inherent 
and fundamental contradiction in consumers’ view on counterfeiting exist – people are willing to buy and wear 
counterfeit goods, but also condemn individuals who do the same. Albers-Miller (1999) studies a “mysterious” demand 
side of the market with counterfeit goods. A discriminant analysis using clusters shows that product type, buying 
situation and price are significant predictors of willingness to buy illicit goods (counterfeits included), although only 
some clusters react on perceived criminal risk.  
Nia and Zaichowsky (2000) carry out very enlightening research – they explore perceptions and attitudes of owners 
of original (genuine) luxury goods towards counterfeits. All respondents consider luxury products worth the price paid, 
no matter if it is original or fake. Owners of just original goods (almost 30 %) consider fakes to be inferior 
(embarrassing) – consuming original goods is more prestigious. On the other hand, owners of both originals and fakes 
believe that counterfeits are not inferior (i.e. create positive image)††. What is surprising, about 70 % of respondents 
answered that the value, satisfaction and status of original luxury brand owners are not decreased by the wide 
availability of counterfeits. According to the authors, availability of fake goods does not negatively affect purchase 
intentions of original luxury brands. 
Phau and Teah (2009) provide a very interesting analysis with direct impact for our research. They examine how 
social and personality factors influence Chinese (Shanghai) consumers’ attitudes towards fake goods and also how 
this opinion influences a purchase of these goods. Purchase intentions are significantly dependent on the attitude 
towards counterfeits as well as on social status and integrity. Phau et al. (2009) conduct a similar research at a large 
Australian university and find out that the only factor influencing attitudes towards counterfeits is integrity. 
Willingness to purchase depends also on an adequate usability of luxury brand goods. We consider this point to be 
very interesting because frequent “mistake” of counterfeit consumers is the purchase of counterfeits of goods, which 
if genuine would be absolutely out of individual’s financial reach. An ownership of such good thus makes it apparent 
that it is in fact a counterfeit. Therefore, such good decreases the owner’s credibility and de facto lowers his/hers utility 
as it contradicts the purchase intentions – to reach a higher social status.‡‡ Moreover, Gino et al. (2010) reveal that 
 
 
†† In this context, it is worth to mention a work by Gistri et al. (2009) who omit a purchase phase and investigate strictly a way 
(ways) how people consume counterfeit goods.  
‡‡ According to the experience-based research of authors, cover stories, which are presented by these owners of counterfeits for 
explaining the ownership, often follow one of three narratives: 1. A gift story (That is a gift.), 2. A produced-as-genuine story (What 
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people wearing counterfeits are less authentic and increase their likelihood of both behaving dishonestly and judging 
others as unethical. 
With regards to social status and conspicuous consumption, Han et al. (2010) distinguish four individuals with 
similarities in purchase behavior and provide specific examples of goods. Firstly, wealthy consumers with a low need 
for status demonstration (patricians), pay a premium for so-called “quiet goods” only they can recognize. Secondly, 
wealthy consumers with a high need for status demonstration (parvenus) use so-called “loud luxury goods” for 
showing their wealth, especially to the lower social status members to which they deliver a simple massage: “I am not 
one of you”. Thirdly, people with a high need for status demonstration, who cannot afford genuine luxury goods 
(poseurs), use “loud counterfeits” to emulate their role models (and imitate their way of live). Last, the fourth group’s 
consumption (proletarians) is normal and just follows satisfying of preferences with no goal like extrication from a 
low-end social status of these members.  
One shouldn’t be surprised that the third mentioned group from this 2010’ research by Han, Nunes and Drèze 
creates an interesting starting point. We assume buyers of counterfeit goods to correspond especially to the third group 
of so-called poseurs. Therefore, we expect that a probability of buying counterfeits should be especially high for people 
who derive high utility from status demonstration but do not possess sufficient means to purchase genuine luxuries, 
i.e. people that could be labeled as poseurs: students without sufficient income, low-educated people following their 
role-models, low-end income households’ members pretending higher social status, unemployed individuals 
pretending success on the job market, and more alike from larger towns where the competition within given social 
environment is higher. In ideal world, a consumer of luxury counterfeits consumption wants to improve her/his social 
status on the one hand and, if rational and smart, also wants to limit a chance that someone else will recognize the fake 
– this indignity could lead even to a loss of the current social status.  
 
3. Data 
In order to estimate our model (see below), we use a newly formed dataset. The data were gathered by the computer-
assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method and the resulting sample consists of answers of 1005 respondents. 
Respondents were selected using the quota sampling method and then further weighted to be representative of the 
Czech population of age 15 and more. Overall, our model includes 8 explanatory categorical variables – Economic 
activity, Income, Government position, Counterfeits, Education, Age, Prejudice, Sex and Town size. While the 
variable Economic activity shows whether respondent is economically active, the variable Income shows into which 
income group the respondent belongs – whether his income is below 20,000 CZK, between 20,001 – 30,000 CZK, 
30,001 – 40,000 CZK or above 40,001 CZK. Education then indicates the level of obtained education – primary, 
secondary and tertiary. Furthermore, because the influence of age may affect the buying of luxury goods non-linearly, 
the original continuous variable is transformed into three categories, the 15-18 age group, 19-65 age group, 65 years 
of age and more. Variable Sex indicates whether respondent is male or female and variable Town size captures the 
population of town in which the respondent resides. The categories are 0 – 4 999, 5 000 – 19 999, 20 000 – 99 999 and 
100 000 and more. 
Beside the variables capturing respondents’ demographics, the other remaining variables capture their stand on 
luxury goods and counterfeits. The variable Quality shows whether respondents think that the original luxury goods 
are significantly better, slightly better or equal in quality compared to their counterfeits. Furthermore, variable 
Government position captures respondents’ opinion on the stand government should take with regards to pursuing 
counterfeiters, whether it should punish them more, less or the same as it is doing now. And lastly, the variable 
Prejudice captures respondents’ opinion about owners of luxury goods. This variable was created in the following 
way. First, the respondents were asked to say the first think that comes to their mind if they see people who surround 
themselves with luxury goods. And second, their answers were then divided into three groups – those that had clear 
 
 
a luck! The good was produced in the same factory as genuine goods, but accidentally ends at the illegal market.), 3. A great deal 
story (I know a man who knows a man and he has access to this kind of goods.).  
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positive undertone, those with clear negative undertone and the third groups including those that were ambiguous (or 
the respondent did not know). 
 
4. Model 
In order to determine the influence of various characteristics on the probability of buying counterfeit goods, we 
formulate discrete choice model with binary dependent variable that can take either value of 1 (respondent buys 
counterfeit goods) or 0 (respondent never buys counterfeit goods). Our model is thus given by୧ ൌ ͳሼݔ௜ᇱߚ ൒ ߝ௜ሽ where 
ݔ௜ᇱߚ denotes our vector of covariates (including the constant) and ߝ௜  the unobserved individual heterogeneity. We 
assume ߝ௜ to be independent of ݔ௜ and to follow logistic distribution. Therefore, the probability that the respondent 
buys counterfeit goods with respect to the vector of covariates is given by the following cumulative distribution 
function:  
 ܲݎሺ୧ ൌ ͳȁݔ௜ᇱߚሻ ൌ ܨఌ೔ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ ൌ
ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
 ( 1) 
Substituting the c.d.f into odds ratio and taking its logarithm we get the so called logit 
 ݈݋݃ ቈܲݎ
ሺ୧ ൌ ͳȁݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ܲݎሺ୧ ൌ Ͳȁݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
቉ ൌ ݈݋݃ ቈ ሺݔ௜
ᇱߚሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ͳ
ͳ ൅ ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
൘ ቉ ൌ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ( 2) 
Therefore, given the unit change in ݔ௜ , we can interpret the coefficients denoted by ߚ  as approximately the 
percentage change in the odds ratios. The model is then estimated via maximum likelihood estimation using the 
following likelihood function 
 ࣦሺߚሻ ൌ ෍ቈݕ௜݈݋݃ ቆ
ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ቇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݕ௜ሻ݈݋݃ ቆͳ െ
ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺݔ௜ᇱߚሻ
ቇ቉
௡
௜ୀଵ
 ( 3) 
5. Results 
Given the statistics presented in (Table 1), the estimated model seems to fit the data well.  
 
Table 1. Model diagnostics 
Model diagnostics 
N 629 
Chi-square 113,072 (p-value<0.000) 
Nagelkerke R Square 0,223 
Cox & Snell R Square 0,165 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (p-value) 0,901 
Predicted percentage in full model 69,5% 
Predicted percentage in model without predictors 59,66% 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The model is statistically significant (as evident from the Chi-square) and it explains approximately 22 % 
(respectively 17 %) of the dependent variable variance. Moreover, the fully specified model is able to correctly predict 
69.5 % of the observations (in comparison with the 59.7 % of the simple model without predictors). 
Looking at the estimation results in (Table 2), at the first glance we can see that the most important factor appears 
to be age. More specifically, children between 15 and 18 years of age have 12 times higher (1200 % higher) odds of 
buying counterfeit goods than people aged 65 and more, people between 19 and 64 years of age have only 1.95 higher 
odds than those aged 65 and more.  
 
Table 2: Model results 
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 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
AGE_b   14.891 2 .001    
AGE_b(1) 2.489 .685 13.198 1 .000 12.043 3.145 46.113 
AGE_b(2) .667 .287 5.403 1 .020 1.949 1.110 3.420 
ACT(1) .859 .231 13.867 1 .000 2.360 1.502 3.709 
LUX2_b2   4.934 2 .085    
LUX2_b2(1) .491 .243 4.079 1 .043 1.635 1.015 2.633 
LUX2_b2(2) -.056 .211 .071 1 .789 .945 .624 1.430 
LUX4   5.339 2 .069    
LUX4(1) .192 .289 .444 1 .505 1.212 .688 2.134 
LUX4(2) .549 .277 3.914 1 .048 1.731 1.005 2.981 
LUX5   21.303 3 .000    
LUX5(1) .434 .284 2.342 1 .126 1.544 .885 2.691 
LUX5(2) .720 .269 7.163 1 .007 2.055 1.213 3.482 
LUX5(3) -.611 .231 6.998 1 .008 .543 .345 .854 
INC   13.424 3 .004    
INC (1) .654 .264 6.108 1 .013 1.922 1.145 3.228 
INC (2) .007 .288 .001 1 .980 1.007 .573 1.770 
INC (3) .723 .304 5.673 1 .017 2.062 1.137 3.739 
SEX(1) -.051 .182 .080 1 .778 .950 .664 1.358 
EDU   .933 2 .627    
EDU(1) -.173 .206 .710 1 .399 .841 .562 1.258 
EDU(2) -.222 .298 .552 1 .458 .801 .446 1.438 
VMB4   12.017 3 .007    
VMB4(1) -.814 .261 9.750 1 .002 .443 .266 .738 
VMB4(2) -.613 .240 6.522 1 .011 .542 .339 .867 
VMB4(3) -.293 .253 1.343 1 .246 .746 .455 1.224 
Constant -1.078 .396 7.413 1 .006 .340   
Source: Own calculations. 
 
This is an interesting result and in terms of the previously outlined groups of counterfeits’ consumers in line with 
the so-called poseurs group. We can assume that income of children between 15 and 18 years of age in the Czech 
Republic is usually dependent on their parents and most likely limited. Furthermore, it could be argued that children 
are more easily influenced by their surroundings and, therefore, motivated more to fit in and emulate their role models. 
Thus, with their income limited, they are more likely to turn to counterfeits to satisfy their need. 
On the other hand, how people view other people who surround themselves with luxury goods seems to be less 
important factor. Those who view owners of luxuries positively have statistically significantly different odds of buying 
counterfeits to those who have neutral or ambiguous attitude towards people who own luxury goods. More specifically 
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their odds are 1.64 times higher. However, there does not seem to be a significant difference between those who view 
them negatively and those who are neutral (or have ambiguous attitude). 
Furthermore, the opinion about the superior quality of luxury goods in comparison with their counterfeits does not 
seem to play a role. There doesn’t seem to be a difference in odds between those who think there is no difference in 
the quality and those who think that luxury goods are superior. Nevertheless, those who think that the difference in 
quality between luxury goods and their counterfeits is only small have 1.73 times greater odds of buying counterfeits 
than those who do not think there is a difference. Therefore, a perception about the quality of genuine goods and 
counterfeit goods does not have the expected influence. Moreover, the experiences with the genuine goods can even 
generate incentives for purchasing counterfeits, as Eisend and Schuchert-Güler (2006) conclude.    
The opinion about the severity of punishment by the government for counterfeiting seems to be a significant factor. 
Phau and Teah (2009) consider attitude towards counterfeits and the social pressure against their consumption as a 
factor that significantly influences the purchase. Our results suggest that those who think that the government should 
be less severe in punishment have 2.06 higher odds of buying counterfeits than those who think that the current status 
quo should be preserved. That can be interpreted that people who buy (or would like to buy) counterfeits are against 
severe punishments of this behavior. On the other hand, those who think that government should be more severe have 
0.54 times the odds (that means they have 46 % lower odds) of those who want to preserve the status quo. The lower 
probability of doing something that one considers as retrievable, is also in favor of authors’ expectations. And lastly, 
those who think there should be no punishment at all do not have statically significant odds from those who want to 
preserve status quo.  
Looking at the results of household income, we can see that the importance of income differs between income 
groups. Those with household income between 20,001 and 30,000 CZK have 1.92 times the odds of buying 
counterfeits compared to those with income equal or below 20,000 CZK. However, those with income between 30,001 
and 40,000 do not have statistically significant difference in odds and those with income above 40,000 have 2.06 times 
the odds of those in the lowest income group. This result, therefore, implies that the relationship between the groups 
proposed by Han et al. (2010) and income does not seem to be quite linear. It seems that people in the lowest income 
group may be either limited in their ability to purchase even counterfeits or have lower interest in trying to 
demonstratively catch up to the more affluent social groups. Nevertheless, it could be in accordance with the above-
mentioned research of Eisend and Schuchert-Güler (2006). The personal experience with a genuine good could 
positively influence the opinion about role of branding towards conspicuous consumption. Middle-class members have 
a higher probability  “to meet” the genuine goods than members of the low-end households§§. However, those above 
the lowest income group may want to distinguish themselves and demonstrate their higher status. Interestingly, 
members of the highest income group have very similar odds suggesting that perhaps they may not want co 
(completely) substitute their status consumption of counterfeits by their status consumption of luxury goods.  
Furthermore, while respondent’s sex and level of education do not seem to play a role, those who are economically 
active have 2.36 higher odds of buying counterfeits than those who are inactive. 
Finally, the size of population of the town the respondents live in does appear to influence the odds. In comparison 
with those who live in a town with population below 5,000, those who live in a town with population of 5,000 or 
higher, but below 20,000, have 56 % lower odds of buying counterfeits. Those who live in a town with population 
between 20,000 and 99,999 have 46 % lower odds. Those who live in a town with population above that do not have 
statistically significantly different odds than those living in town with population below 5,000. Therefore, it seems that 
it is either in very small communities or in large towns that people turn to status consumption. 
Having analyzed the model fit and results, we can use it to predict the probability of buying counterfeits for 
representatives of certain groups (people with given characteristics). For example, a student has 95 % probability of 
 
 
§§ People, who recognize brands and realize the correlation between luxury brands and wealth, have higher probability to 
demonstrate status through consumption than people with no experience. 
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buying counterfeits.*** A typical small town resident has probability 68 %.††† A city resident and a member of the low-
end social group has probability 62 %.‡‡‡ A city resident in the high social group has probability 83 %.§§§ A retiree has 
probability only 10 %.**** And, finally, “average Joe” from the Czech Republic has 50% probability of buying 
counterfeit goods.†††† 
 
Table 3: Categorical Variables Coding 
 Frequency Parameter coding 
(1) (2) (3) 
Population of the place of residence 
0 – 4,999 [reference] 191 .000 .000 .000 
5,000 - 19,999 [VMB4(1)] 96 1.000 .000 .000 
20,000 – 99,999 [VMB4(2)] 173 .000 1.000 .000 
100,000 and more [VMB4(3)] 169 .000 .000 1.000 
The government can take different
position on counterfeiting of shoes,
watches, etc. Which of the following
options is closest to your own stand?
The government should…  
Punish in the same way as now
[reference] 
288 .000 .000 .000 
Do not punish [LUX5(1)] 97 1.000 .000 .000 
Punish with less intensity than now
[LUX5(2)] 
110 .000 1.000 .000 
Punish with more intensity than now
[LUX5(3)] 
134 .000 .000 1.000 
Gross income of household 
Below 20,000 CZK [reference] 125 .000 .000 .000 
20,001-30,000 CZK [INC(1)] 165 1.000 .000 .000 
30,001-40,000 CZK [INC(2)] 155 .000 1.000 .000 
More than 40,000 CZK [INC(3)] 184 .000 .000 1.000 
How do you perceive people who buy
and wear luxury goods? 
Positively [LUX2_b2(1)] 139 1.000 .000  
Negatively [LUX2_b2(2)] 185 .000 1.000  
Neutrally / Unclearly [reference] 305 .000 .000  
 
 
*** Our representative “student” is calculated as a person of age 15-18, who is not economically active, who has completed 
elementary education and lives in a city with population above 100,000, who lives in a household with monthly gross income of 
20k-30k CZK, who believes counterfeiters should not be punished, who thinks that there is significant difference between quality 
of counterfeits and original goods, who has positive opinion about people surrounding themselves with luxuries and who is a female. 
Nevertheless, as we already discussed sex doesn’t play much role here and though we calculate all our representatives as female, 
males with the same characteristics have almost the same probability. 
††† Age 19-64, economically active, high school diploma, small town (below 5k), lowest income group (below 20k), believes 
counterfeiters should be punished the same as they currently are, has negative opinion about people with luxury goods, who thinks 
that there is slight difference between quality of counterfeits and original goods. 
‡‡‡ Age 19-64, economically active, high school diploma, big town (100k+), lowest income group (below 20k), believes 
counterfeiters should be punished the same as they currently are, has negative opinion about people with luxury goods, who thinks 
that there is slight difference between quality of counterfeits and original goods. 
§§§  Age 19-64, economically active, university diploma, big town (100k+), highest income group (above 40k), believes 
counterfeiters should be punished less than they currently are, has neutral opinion about people with luxury goods, who thinks that 
there is big difference between quality of counterfeits and original goods. 
**** Age 65+, economically inactive, high school diploma, smaller town (5k-20k), lowest income group (below 20k), believes 
counterfeiters should be punished more than they currently are, has negative opinion about people with luxury goods, who thinks 
that there is slight difference between quality of counterfeits and original goods. 
†††† Age 19-64, economically active, high school diploma, smaller town (5k-20k), second lowest income group (20-30k), 
believes counterfeiters should be punished the same as they currently are, has neutral opinion about people with luxury goods, who 
thinks that there is slight difference between quality of counterfeits and original goods. 
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Age 
Students (15-18 yrs) [AGE_b(1)] 21 1.000 .000  
Active (19-65 yrs) [AGE_b(2)] 519 .000 1.000  
Retired (65 yrs +) [reference] 89 .000 .000  
Do you consider any difference in a
quality of original good and a
counterfeit? 
Original good is significantly better
than counterfeit good [LUX4(1)] 
276 1.000 .000  
Original good is slightly better than
counterfeit good [LUX4(2] 
264 .000 1.000  
There is no difference between the
quality of original good and counterfeit
good [reference] 
89 .000 .000  
Education 
Primary education [reference] 320 .000 .000  
High school [EDU(1)] 234 1.000 .000  
University [EDU(2)] 75 .000 1.000  
Economic activity Active 385 1.000   Incactive 244 .000   
Sex Male 296 1.000   Female 333 .000   
Source: Own calculations. 
6. Conclusion 
We live in a society where a social status directly affects potential wellbeing of an individual, because the 
individual’s status determines social interactions, institutions or environment in which individuals behave (e.g. Stark, 
2006). Consumption habits are one of forms how people assign themselves to the certain social status, i.e. how they 
signal their success, wealth, values, political orientation, etc.  
Our research deals with the issue of quasi-demonstration of social status via consumption of counterfeit goods. 
Using the own survey data (respondents from the Czech Republic), we calculate the probability of buying counterfeits 
of luxury goods and get several findings.   
The measure age is a significant factor in explaining consumption of counterfeits. Children between 15 and 18 years 
of age seem most likely to purchase counterfeit goods. This is in line with the so-called poseurs group. An effort to 
demonstrate social status in “early social interactions” is very typical for youngsters. They probably do not care so 
much whether the demonstration effect is provided via original goods or counterfeits‡‡‡‡, but their budget constraint is 
a relevant factor affecting consumption towards counterfeits. 
The measure size of a community people live in is a significant factor of buying status goods. It seems that it is 
either in very small communities (intention to differentiate themselves) or in large towns (intention to follow success) 
that people turn to status consumption. This conclusion of the model relates to another measure: income of household. 
Economic situation of a household significantly influences a probability of buying counterfeits in all household income 
clusters, what is in accordance with the economic theory (budget constraint) as well as with the socioeconomic 
scholarly literature – middle-class members are more likely to focus on demonstrative consumption, because they are 
closer to high-end social status and so they adopt behavior of their role models. The budget constraint of low-class 
members as well as ignorance of luxury brands create main barrier to status consumption.  
Furthermore, individuals’ opinion about legality of selling counterfeits influences the probability of its purchase. 
People condemning the market with counterfeits have lower probability for entering the market, whereas people with 
weak opinion about illegality and noxiousness of counterfeits do not mind it. 
Results of the research seem to be consistent with the interpretation of counterfeit purchase as a way to raise status 
/ fit in with some reference group. Given the characteristics of various social groups, unsurprisingly, representative 
“students” are the most likely group to purchase counterfeits. Furthermore, high social group city residents also have 
 
 
‡‡‡‡ The brand is a tool, price tag or bill from a shop are not. 
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high probability of buying luxuries. Thus, it seems they want to either purchase status at lowest cost or want to consume 
luxury goods but find counterfeits sufficient substitutes for the genuine articles.  
The consumption of counterfeit goods could be understood as a “status elevator”, i.e. effort to change the current 
status through consumption of goods typical for a higher status group. However, a revelation of the counterfeit good, 
when considered as socially unacceptable, could mean the elevator goes down, i.e. in contradiction with the preferred 
direction. Considering the consumption of counterfeits, it means the utility maximization generates special conditions 
to follow - not just preferences and budget constraint, but also social constraints created by interaction within both 
current and chosen reference groups. 
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